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Abstract. This study empirically investigates three hypotheses. The first is that higher 
levels of economic freedom in an economy promote a higher growth rate of economic activity 
and hence yield a higher growth rate of per capita real GDP in that economy. The second 
hypothesis is that higher quality government regulation leads to a more efficient economic 
system, in large part by interfering less with market functioning and in part by not adding 
unnecessarily to the cost of conducting business in the marketplace, and thereby leads to a higher 
per capita real GDP growth rate. The third hypothesis is that the higher the taxation level/burden 
relative to GDP in an economy, the lower the growth rate of private sector spending and hence 
the lower the growth rate of per capita real GDP in that economy. Using a panel dataset for 
OECD nations over the 2003 through 2006 period, fixed effects PLS estimations find compelling 
evidence in support of all three of these hypotheses. 
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1.-  Introduction 
Over the past quarter of a century, numerous studies have been conducted expressly to 
investigate the impact of economic freedom on economic growth.  Most of these empirical 
studies find that there exists a positive and statistically significant impact of economic freedom, 
especially a measure of overall economic freedom, on the rate of economic growth  (Ali, 1997; 
Ali and Crain, 2001; Bennett and Vedder, 2013; Cebula, 2011; Clark and Lawson, 2008; Cole, 
2003; Dawson, 1998, 2003; De Haan and Strum, 2000; Goldsmith, 1995; Gwartney, Holcombe, 
and Lawson, 2006; Hall, 2013; Hall, Sobel, and Crowley, 2010; Heckelman, 2000; Heckelman 
and Stroup, 2000; Nissan and Niroomand, 2008; Norton, 1998).  This common finding is 
predicated presumably upon the ability of increased economic freedom to elevate the growth rate 
of economic activity through incentives to work, invest, save, hire/dismiss, make market-based 
business decisions, and engage in risk-reward economic behaviors in a market-based economy.1    
This study seeks to extend this literature by: (1) deleting from the overall measure of 
economic freedom generated by the Heritage Foundation three “problematic” measures of 
economic freedom, one which introduces extensive multi-collinearity (fiscal freedom) into the 
system and two whose composition not only predominantly consists of some form of market 
regulation per se (business freedom and financial freedom) but also introduces significant multi-
collinearity into the model;  and (2) replacing these three economic freedom measures with (a) a 
more direct and much more comprehensive measure of the total burden of government taxation 
and (b) an overall measure of “regulatory quality” per se, respectively.  
Accordingly, in the pursuit of providing more dependable and useful insight into the 
economic growth-economic freedom/tax burden/government regulation linkage, this study 
empirically investigates three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that higher levels of economic 
freedom in an economy promote a higher growth rate of economic activity and hence yield a 
higher growth rate of per capita real GDP in that economy, ceteris paribus. The second 
hypothesis is that higher quality government regulation leads to a more efficient economic 
system, in large part by interfering less with market functioning and in part by not adding 
unnecessarily to the cost of conducting business in the marketplace, and thereby leads to a higher 
per capita real GDP growth rate, ceteris paribus. The third hypothesis, which appears especially 
relevant in view of both recent policies and current plans in the U.S., France, and other OECD 
                                                 
1 The emphasis in this study parallels in principle the alternative perspective focusing on economic freedom and the 
per capita real income level, such as that in Wiseman and Young (2011) for states within the U.S, and certain other 
studies, including Grubel (1997), Islam (1996), and Nissan and Niroomand (2008). 
 
nations that involve raising personal and/or corporate income tax rates in recent years, is that the 
higher the taxation level/burden relative to GDP in an economy, the lower the growth rate of 
private sector spending and hence the lower the growth rate of per capita real GDP in that 
economy, ceteris paribus.  
 To provide a broad and diverse context for the empirical analysis of these hypotheses, we 
focus on the 30 member nations of the OECD in the pre-Great Recession period from 2003 
through 2006.2 Within this perspective, the present study investigates whether international 
(purchasing-power-parity adjusted) percentage per capita real GDP growth rate differentials are a 
function of differential growth rates of economic freedom,  differentials in the growth of the 
quality of government regulation, and differentials in the growth rate of the burden of 
government taxation. A number of estimates are provided to demonstrate the resiliency and 
consistency of the findings of the basic model. 
 
2.- The Basic Framework: An Eclectic Model 
In this study, per capita real income is measured by the per capita real GDP level in each of the 
OECD nations over the four-year study period from 2003 through 2006.  The value of per capita 
real GDP (income) is made comparable across nations by PPP (purchasing-power-parity) 
adjustments.  With RPCY being the PPP adjusted level of per capita real GDP, the percentage 
increase in per capita real GDP, i.e, the percentage increase in RPCY, is an economic variable 
that parallels, in principle, the focus of most of the more recent related studies on 
macroeconomic growth (Cebula, 2011; Goldsmith, 1995; Ali, 1997; Norton, 1998; Dawson, 
1998, 2003; Cole, 2003; Hall, 2013; Hall, Sobel, and Crowley, 2010; Bennett and Vedder, 2013).  
                                                 
2 Each nation during this time frame can be regarded either as a nation per se or as a de facto “economic region” 
within the OECD. 
Given the emphasis in this study on the role of economic freedom in determining the growth rate 
of per capita real GDP (income) and hence international differentials thereof, the most 
fundamental hypothesis of this study is that the percentage increase in per capita real GDP 
depends directly upon the percentage increase in economic freedom (FREEDOM) in each of its 
various studied forms, ceteris paribus. In addition, as explained above, the percentage increase in 
per capita real GDP is hypothesized to be an increasing function of the percentage increase in 
regulatory quality, REGQUAL,3 because high quality regulation interferes less with the efficient 
functioning of firms’ decision-making processes in a market-based economy and contributes less 
to firms’ production costs, ceteris paribus (Upadhyaya, Raymond, and Mixon, 1997; Clark, 
Boettke, and Stringham, 2008; Ugur, 2009; Yandle, 2013). Furthermore, the percentage increase in 
per capita real GDP is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of the percentage increase in the 
tax burden, expressed as a percent of GDP, TAXREVGDP,4 because higher tax burdens reduce 
the growth rate of disposable income and thereby limit the growth rate of the ability to purchase 
new goods and services and hence reduce/restrict the rate of growth of economic activity, ceteris 
paribus.  
The percentage rate of growth in per capita real GDP is also hypothesized to be a 
function of political stability as well as economic variables such as unemployment rates and ex 
post real long term interest rates, UR and RLONGINTR, respectively. Thus, the basic framework 
for analysis is initially expressed, as follows: 
                                                 
3 The variable REGQUAL is adopted in lieu of the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedoms referred to as 
“business freedom” and “financial freedom.” 
 
4 The variable TAXREVGDP is adopted in lieu of the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom referred to as 
“fiscal freedom.” 
 
Percentage increase in RPCYjt = f(percentage increase in FREEDOMnjt, percentage increase in 
TAXREVGDPjt, percentage increase in REGQUALjt, percentage increase in POLSTABjt, 
percentage increase in URjt, percentage increase in RLONGINTR)          (1) 
where: RPCYjt is the level of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per capita real income (GDP) 
in OECD nation j in year t and the percentage increase in RPCYjt is the percentage growth rate 
of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per capita real GDP in OECD nation j in year t;  
FREEDOMnjt refers to the value of the economic freedom measure (index) n in nation j in year t 
(n=7 in each of the estimations, as explained below);  
TAXREVGDPjt is the ratio of all taxes in nation j to the GDP level within nation j in year t, 
expressed as percent;   
REGQUALjt refers to the role played by government in the economy under the rubric of 
regulations and in fact is an index that measures the overall quality of those regulations in nation 
j in year t;  
POLSTABjt is an index that measures the degree of political stability in each nation/region j in 
year t;   
URjt is the unemployment rate and long term interest rate, in nation j in year t; and 
RLONGINTRjt is the ex post real long term rate of interest in nation j in year t.5  
 
3. - Economic Freedom, Tax Burden, and Regulatory Quality 
This study considers the economic freedom indices developed by The Heritage Foundation 
(2013).  Based on the central hypothesis investigated in this study, as stated above, as well as a 
                                                 
5 Although a dummy variable for G8 nations is also included in certain estimations as a control variable. 
body of literature using earlier data, the growth rate of per capita real GDP is expected to be an 
increasing function of these indices of economic freedoms, ceteris paribus.    
Arguably, the present study extends the literature on economic growth and economic 
freedom in a number of ways. To begin with, this study differs with most prior studies by 
focusing on OECD nations. In addition, it estimates a balanced four-year (2003 through 2006) 
panel dataset by fixed-effects. Furthermore, the present study constructs an overall average 
measure of economic freedom which expressly discards three of the ten Heritage Foundation 
(2013) economic freedoms, namely, fiscal freedom, business freedom, and financial freedom, 
primarily because of the multi-collinearity problems their presence creates and partly to replace 
them with arguably better variables to measure what the fiscal freedom, business freedom, and 
financial freedoms seek to measure, namely, by two separate variables: the ratio of all taxes to 
GDP (expressed as a percent) and a direct measure of regulatory quality, the principal 
component of both financial freedom and business freedom. These substitutions are further 
explained later on in this section of the study. Finally, the present analysis provides a number of 
de facto economic control variables and a de facto political control variable.6 
Given this context, we first identify freedom from excessive government size, or simply 
government size freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2013), an index that reflects the degree of 
freedom in an economy from the burden of excessive government in terms of expenditures (i.e., 
freedom from government on the expenditure side).  Government outlays compete with private 
agents and interfere with natural market processes, prices, and interest rates by over-stimulating 
demand and diverting resources through “crowding out” effects, with government deficits 
                                                 
6 Included in all of the estimates is a non-linear trend variable, and in two of the estimates there is a dummy/binary 
variable for G8 nations. 
typically being the financing vehicle leading to reduced economic growth (Carlson and Spencer, 
1975; Cebula, 1978; Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). This economic freedom is labeled HECFR1. 
The trade freedom index reflects the openness of an economic system to imports of goods 
and services from other nations and the ability of citizens to interact freely as buyers and sellers 
in the global marketplace.  Government hindrance of the free flow of such commerce (through 
taxation of imports and/or exports, bans, quotas, and so forth) has a negative impact on the 
ability of individuals and firms to pursue their economic goals (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This 
economic freedom is denoted as HECFR2 
A free citizenry requires a steady and reliable currency as a medium of exchange and as a 
store of value.  The monetary freedom index is an indicator of stable currency and market-
determined prices.  A high degree of monetary freedom is characterized by an independent 
central bank, policies promoting low inflation, and the absence of price controls (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is referred to here as HECFR3. 
The investment freedom index is greater in a nation with (1) fewer restrictions on foreign 
investment, (2) fewer restrictions that tend to limit capital inflows and outflows, and (3) fewer 
restrictions that hinder the ability of capital to flow to its best and most efficient use.  Such 
restrictions interfere with the freedom of investors and firms seeking capital (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is referred to here as HECFR4. 
Secure property rights provide citizens the confidence to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities, including commercial activities, saving, investing, and risk taking.  The ability to 
accumulate private property is a primary motivation, if not the primary motivation, for 
participation in a market economy; a “rule of law” that effectively protects property rights is 
critical to an efficient free market economy. The greater the protections afforded to property 
rights under the rule of law, the greater the property rights freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 
2013).  This economic freedom is referred to here as HECFR5. 
Political corruption by public officials manifests itself in many forms, including bribery, 
extortion, embezzlement, and graft, and it enables certain public officials to steal or otherwise 
profit illegitimately from public funds or the abuse of political power.  Political corruption 
interferes with market efficiency.  The freedom from corruption index indicates the degree to 
which an economy is free from such forms of corruption (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This 
economic freedom is labeled as HECFR6. 
The labor freedom index is a composite index that reflects freedom from government 
wage and price controls and measures the ability of both workers and firms to interact freely 
without restrictions imposed by government. The greater the degree of labor freedom in an 
economy, the more efficient and productive is that economy (Heritage Foundation, 2013; Nissan 
and Niroomand, 2008).   This economic freedom is referred to here as HECFR7.  
The fiscal freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 2013) reflects the freedom of individuals 
and firms to keep and control their income and wealth for their own use/benefit.  Fiscal freedom 
is a measure of freedom from the burden of government (from the revenue side): the lower this 
burden, the higher the value of the fiscal freedom index. Technically, fiscal freedom includes 
freedom from the tax burden, in terms of both the top income tax rate (on corporations and 
individuals, taken separately) and the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of a nation’s 
GDP.  The underlying premise is that higher taxation not only interferes with the ability of 
individuals and businesses to pursue their goals in the marketplace, it may also reduce the 
incentive to work, save, invest, or take risk. This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR8. 
Nearly all nations impose some form of supervision/oversight on banking institutions and 
the providers of other financial services, including markets for equities. The financial freedom 
index is an indicator of the degree to which the financial sector of the economy is free from 
excessive banking and financial regulation (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom 
is labeled HECFR9.  
The business freedom index reflects the individual’s right and ability to freely conduct 
entrepreneurial activities (i.e., to create, to operate and thereby to make economic, financial, and 
management decisions, and to close an enterprise without government interference).  It is argued 
that burdensome, redundant regulations are the most common barriers to the free conduct of 
entrepreneurial endeavors, and indeed are a de facto form of taxation that makes it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to produce goods and services (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic 
freedom is labeled HECFR10. 
Of the ten economic freedoms measured above, three, HECFR8, HEFFR9, and 
HECFR10, are of special interest here in terms of whether there is a reasonable alternative way 
in which to capture their essential significance but perhaps in either a more direct fashion or in a 
technically less problematic fashion, i.e., one that avoids multi-collinearity with one or more 
other economic freedom measures.  In particular, to measure the overall level of economic 
freedom using the Heritage Foundation (2013) indices of economic freedom and simultaneously 
to address the fact that, technically, these three specific economic freedoms create multi-
collinearity problems and may have other limitations, we define, with these three notable 
exceptions (fiscal freedom, HECFR8, financial freedom, HECFR9,  and business freedom, 
HECFR10) the overall economic freedom measure, FREEDOMjt, as the average of the 
economic freedoms described above, where n denotes the nth economic freedom:7 
   7 
FREEDOMjt = ƩHECFRnjt/7, j=1,…,29 for t = 2003,…, 2006         (2) 
      n=1 
 
 The principal reason for defining the overall freedom index without fiscal freedom 
(HECFR8) included is that HECFR8 is highly correlated (r = 0.767) with government size 
freedom, HECFR1, and therefore introduces a multi-collinearity problem. In addition, however, 
it is noteworthy that the HECFR8 index is constructed in part with an arguably excessive focus 
on just the top corporate and personal income tax brackets so that it may potentially fail to 
provide a systematic and purely objective inclusion of the remainder of the corporate and 
personal income tax structures, be they imposed by central governments or sub-central 
government entities. In point of fact, there are also numerous other tax forms besides income 
taxation that arguably must be systematically considered when quantifying fiscal freedom. 
Accordingly, HECFR8 is replaced with a simple measure of the overall tax burden in each of the 
OECD nations, TAXREVGDPjt. This substitute for fiscal freedom has two advantages over 
HECFR8: simplicity and comprehensiveness on the one hand, i.e., it is computed as simply the 
sum of all taxes in nation j in year t expressed as a percent of GDP, and on the other hand, it is 
not highly correlated with HECFR1 (r =0.392). In the spirit of HECFR8, it is of course expected 
that real per capita GDP growth is a decreasing function of TAXREVGDPjt, ceteris paribus 
(Clark and Lawson, 2008; Cebula, 2011; Yandle, 2013), i.e., the greater the percentage rate of 
increase in TAXREVGDPjt, the lower the percentage rate of increase in per capita real GDP.   
                                                 
7 This problem of multi-collinearity is actually suggested by the Heritage Foundation (2013, pp. 15-16), 
 A fundamental reason for defining the overall freedom index with financial freedom 
(HECHR9) and business freedom (HECFR10) excluded is the simple fact that these economic 
freedom measures, whose principal component is government regulation in a variety of forms, 
also are highly correlated (r = 0.646 and r=0.632, respectively) with investment freedom. That 
said, in order to reflect the role of government in the economic environment as a regulator per 
se, this study adopts in place of HECFR9 and HECFR10 the variable described as “regulatory 
quality” by the World Bank Institute (2012, p. 1). This regulatory quality variable, expressed by 
the symbol REGQUALjt in the present study, is an index that reflects “…the ability of the 
government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector 
development” (World Bank Institute, 2012, p. 9). It is hypothesized that the greater/the higher 
the degree of regulatory quality in nation j in year t, REGQUALjt, i.e., the greater the percentage 
rate of increase of REGQUALjt, the greater the percentage rate of growth of economic activity 
and hence the greater the growth rate of per capita real GDP in nation j in year t, ceteris paribus 
(Upadhyaya, Raymond, and Mixon, 1997; Ugur, 2009; Yandle, 2013, esp. pp. 5-9).8 Finally, the 
percentage rate of increase in real GDP, in the spirit of the existing literature on growth and 
economic freedom, is hypothesized to be an increasing function of the percentage rate of 
increase of the seven-pronged economic freedom variable FREEDOMjt, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.- Economic and Political Stability Control Variables and a Trend Variable 
In addition to the hypothesized impacts of economic freedom, taxes as a percent of GDP, and 
regulatory quality on real per capita GDP growth, this study initially includes two explicitly 
economic “control” variables, a political control variable, and a trend variable. The explicitly 
                                                 
8 The potential economic significance of regulation (good quality) is considered in a diverse literature 
(Mixon, 1994, 1995; Yandle, 2013; Clark, Boettke and Stringham, 2008). 
economic control variables are the average percentage unemployment rate in country j in year t 
(URjt) and the average ex post real long term rate of interest in country j in year t (RLONGINTjt). 
As noted in Cecchetti (2006, p. 567), the unemployment rate variable controls for the expected 
negative influence of higher unemployment rates on per capita real income growth: the greater 
the percentage rate of increase of the labor force that is unemployed, the lower the percentage 
rate of increase in per capita real GDP, ceteris paribus. Next, as observed by Cecchetti (2006, p. 
555), “…the economic decisions of households to save and of firms to invest depend on the real 
interest rate…” Similarly, Mishkin (2013, p. 609) observes that the traditional view is that “…a 
fall in real interest rates…lowers the cost of borrowing, causing a rise in investment 
spending…and consumer durable expenditure…” According to the “conventional wisdom” 
then,9  the higher the ex post real long term rate of interest, the lower the present value of 
investment for firms and hence the lower the rate of investment in new plant and equipment, 
ceteris paribus. Moreover, consumption, particularly consumption of durable goods (including 
housing), is likely also a decreasing function of the ex post real long term rate of interest, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, the higher the percentage rate of increase in the ex post real long term interest 
rate, the lower the percentage rate of increase in economic activity and hence the lower the 
percentage growth rate of per capita real GDP.  
We also introduce a political control variable for each nation, POLSTABjt, which is an 
index of political stability and the absence of violence in those nations. It is hypothesized that 
economic prosperity and economic growth for an economy as a whole should be an increasing 
function of political stability, which by its very nature, promotes orderly or lower risk decision 
making and greater efficiency for markets to function in an economic system (World Bank 
                                                 
9 See also Jansen, Delorme, and Ekelund (1994, esp. pp. 268-269), Taylor, 1999, p. 95), and Allison (2013, pp. 26-
270). 
Institute, 2012, p. 9; Clark and Lawson, 2006; Cebula, 2011) and thereby should act, ceteris 
paribus, to elevate per capita real GDP growth, i.e., the greater the rate of increase in the index 
of political stability, the greater the rate of increase in per capita real GDP.  Finally, the non-
linear trend variable, TR, is included to account for trending of variables/data over the four-year 
study period. Interestingly, use of a linear trend variable in place of the non-linear trend variable 
does not alter the conclusions in any instance.  
For the interested reader, it is observed that the variables reflecting “regulatory quality” 
and “political stability” are in fact quite different. The variable used to measure regulatory 
quality, REGQUAL, reflects the ability of the government of a nation both to formulate and 
execute/implement sound, rational, and objective policies and regulations that not only permit 
but also promote private sector development and efficiency (World Bank, 2012, p. 5). By 
contrast, the variable used to reflect political stability, POLSTAB, actually measures the 
perceived likelihood that the government of a nation is vulnerable to being destabilized or even 
overthrown by either constitutional or violent means, with the latter including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism (World Bank Institute, 2012, p. 9). From a different 
perspective, to illustrate how statistically unrelated these two variables are, the zero-order 
correlation coefficient between them is nearly 0, i.e., r = 0.068.  
 
5.- Fixed-Effects Estimation Results 
Predicated upon the eclectic framework of determinants of the percentage increase in per capita 
real GDP described above, the following model is to be estimated initially: 
Log RPCYjt = a + b log FREEDOMjt + c log REGQUALjt + d log TAXREVGDPjt  
+e log POLSTABjt + f log URjt + g log RLONGINTRjt + h TR         (3) 
  
where it is hypothesized that: 
 b > 0,  c > 0,  d < 0, e > 0,  f <0,  g < 0              (4) 
 
Data for each of the seven economic freedom variables/indices (HECFRnjt) considered here, the 
average of which is the variable FREEDOMjt,  were obtained from the Heritage Foundation 
(2013); data for the PPP (purchasing-power-parity) adjusted real per capita GDP variable 
(RPCY) were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (2013); data for the variables 
TAXREVGDP, UR, and RLONGINTR (more specifically, the percentage nominal average annual 
long term interest rate yield minus the percentage annual inflation rate) were obtained from the 
OECD (2013); and data for the governance indices for regulatory quality (REGQUAL) and 
political stability (POLSTAB) were obtained from the World Bank Institute (2012). Finally, TR is 
a non-linear trend variable.  Descriptive statistics for each of the non-trend variables in the 
analysis are provided in Table 1.  
Equation (3), which is expressed in log-log form, was estimated by PLS (panel least 
squares), first using the random effects model and then using the fixed-effects model.  In this 
log-log specification, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was performed, and it 
generated a t-statistic with a p = .0412, so that the study adopts the fixed-effects model.  Similar 
outcomes, i.e., p < .05, were obtained for all of the models estimated in this study, so that all of 
the results provided in the present study are fixed-effects estimates. 
Equation (3) is estimated adopting the White (1980) cross-section correction.10 These 
results are provided in column (a) of Table 2, where all six of the estimated elasticity values for 
the non-trend variables exhibit the expected signs.  Of these six elasticity values, four are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, one is statistically significant at the 5% level, and one is 
                                                 
10 All of the estimations in this study adopt the White (1980) cross-section heteroskedasticity correction. 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, the trend variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Thus, as hypothesized, these fixed-effects results reveal that the percentage growth rate in 
per capita real GDP among OECD nations during the study period is an increasing function of 
economic freedom and regulatory quality and a decreasing function of the tax burden (as a 
percent of GDP), as well as the unemployment rate and the ex post real long term interest rate. 
Furthermore, there is modest evidence of a positive impact of political stability on that real GDP 
growth rate. Thus, for example, a one percent increase in the Heritage Foundation overall 
economic freedom index, as computed in equation (2), would elevate the per capita real GDP 
growth rate by 1.02%. Therefore, a rise in this Heritage Foundation (2013) measure of economic 
freedom index of 10% presumably would be expected to elevate the per capita real GDP growth 
rate by approximately 10.2%. In addition, a rise in the REGQUAL index of one percent would 
raise the per capita real GDP growth rate by 1.035%, whereas a rise of one percent in the 
percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate by 0.404%. 
Furthermore, a one percent rise in the unemployment rate or the ex post real long term interest 
rate would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate by 0.167% or 0.38%, respectively. 
Finally, there is weak/modest evidence that a one percent rise in the political stability index 
would raise the real per capita GDP growth rate by 0.176%. The coefficient of determination 
values (the R2 and adjusted R2) imply that the model explains three-fourths or more of the 
variation in the dependent variable, the percentage per capita real GDP growth rate.  
Furthermore, for the interested reader, Table 3 provides the correlation matrix among the 
explanatory variables in equation (3); clearly, multi-collinearity is not a serious problem.  
The estimate in column (a) of Table 2 is predicated upon a composite index of seven 
Heritage Foundation (2013) measures of economic freedom as well as an index of regulatory 
quality and the burden of government taxation; the estimate also includes an index of political 
stability and two explicitly economic variables, one reflecting unemployment and the other the 
long term cost of borrowing. As a modest test of the resiliency and consistency of the 
conclusions for the per capita real GDP growth rate effects of economic freedom, as well as the 
regulatory quality and tax-burden variables, which are the focus explanatory variables in this 
study, the next estimation provided in Table 2 of this study offers alternative fixed-effects results 
of a parallel model. The difference between the specification of this alternative model and that 
considered in column (a) of Table 2 is the adoption of a de facto economic control dummy 
variable, G8DUMMY, which assumes a value of 1 for a G8 nation and a value of 0 otherwise. 
This variable is included in the analysis to control for the fact that G8 nations tend to have 
educational, technology, infrastructure, and other advantages as compared with many if not most 
non-G8 nations and the fact that these advantages tend to result in labor higher productivity and 
labor productivity growth and hence higher percentage growth rates in per capita real GDP, 
ceteris paribus (Nissan and Niroomand, 2010).  
The log-log estimations of the basic model with the G8DUMMY included can be found in 
column (b) of Table 2, where all seven of the estimated non-trend elasticity values exhibit the 
expected signs, with four statistically significant at the 1% level and three statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Thus, the percentage per capita real GDP growth rate is found to have been an 
increasing function of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability. It also is 
positively impacted by having G8 status, as hypothesized. The percentage per capita real GDP 
growth rate is also a decreasing function of a higher tax burden, the unemployment rate, and the 
ex post real long term interest rate. More specifically, a one percent increase in the Heritage 
Foundation overall economic freedom index, as computed in equation (2), would elevate the per 
capita real GDP growth rate by 1.093%. In addition, a rise in the REGQUAL index of one 
percent would raise the per capita real GDP growth rate by 1.03%, whereas a rise of one percent 
in the percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate by 
0.36%. Furthermore, a one percent rise in the unemployment rate or the ex post real long term 
interest rate would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate by 0.17% or 0.33%, respectively, 
whereas a one percent rise in the political stability index would raise the real per capita GDP 
growth rate by 0.185%. Finally, there are the results for the G8DUMMY variable. According to 
column (b), being a G8 nation implies a roughly 0.159% higher percentage growth rate of per 
capita real GDP. 
Additionally, the non-linear trend variable is statistically significant (and negative) at the 
5% level, attesting once again to the propriety of its inclusion in the model. The coefficients of 
determination (R2 = 0.79; adjusted R2 = 0.77) imply the model explains more than three-fourths 
of the variation in the dependent variable. Clearly, among other things, this estimate provides 
strong support for the three central hypotheses being investigated in this study.    
To further test the consistency and resiliency of the model, in column (c) of Table 2, we 
introduce another variable, in particular, the one-year lag of the dependent variable. In this 
estimation, seven of the eight estimated non-trend elasticity values exhibit the expected signs, 
with four statistically significant at the 1% level and three statistically significant at the 5% level; 
meanwhile, the trend variable is once again negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficients of determination (R2 = 0.79; adjusted R2 = 0.77) imply the model once again 
explains more than three-fourths of the variation in the dependent variable.  
Clearly, among other things, this estimate provides support for the three central 
hypotheses being investigated in this study. In particular, from these results, we infer that the 
percentage increase in the per capita real GDP growth rate is an increasing function of the 
percentage increase in economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability, as well as by 
having G8 status, once again, as hypothesized. The percentage increase in the per capita real 
GDP growth rate is also a decreasing function of the percentage increase in the tax burden, the 
unemployment rate, and the ex post real long term interest rate.  Additionally, the non-linear 
trend variable is statistically significant (and negative) at the 5% level, attesting once again to the 
propriety of its inclusion in the model. Finally, although the lagged dependent variable was not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level, its inclusion in the model did not alter these basic 
implications of the model. 
As for the findings in column (c) of Table 2, a one percent increase in the Heritage 
Foundation overall economic freedom index, as computed in equation (2), would elevate the 
percentage increase in per capita real GDP by 1.355%. In addition, a rise in the REGQUAL index 
of one percent would raise the per capita real GDP growth rate by 1.01%, whereas a rise of one 
percent in the percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate 
by 0.384%. Furthermore, a one percent rise in the unemployment rate or the ex post real long 
term interest rate would reduce the per capita real GDP growth rate by 0.172% or 0.35%, 
respectively. There also is evidence that a one percent rise in the political stability index would 
raise the real per capita GDP growth rate by 0.19%. Finally, according to column (c) being a G8 
nation implies a roughly 0.155% higher percentage growth rate of per capita real GDP. 
 
 
6.- Additional Results: Dynamic Fixed Effects PLS Estimates 
As a simple test of the robustness of the results provided in Table 2, we re-estimate the basic 
system in somewhat different terms. In particular, rather than defining economic growth in terms 
of the percentage change in per capita real GDP, we define economic growth, as well as all of 
the explanatory variables, simply in change form. For example, the variable for economic growth 
becomes the change in PPP-adjusted per capita real GDP (∆RPCYjt). Thus, the model consists 
of the following, in addition to ∆RPCYjt: the freedom variable becomes simply the change in the 
economic freedom index (∆FREEDOMjt); the regulation variable is simply the change in the 
value of the regulation index (∆REGQUALjt); the tax variable becomes the change in the ratio of 
the total tax burden to GDP (∆TAXREVGDPjt); and so forth, so that the new version of the basic 
model becomes the following dynamic fixed effects model: 
∆RPCYjt = a’ + b’ ∆FREEDOMjt + c’ ∆REGQUALjt + d’ ∆TAXREVGDPjt  
+e’ ∆POLSTABjt + f’ ∆URjt +g’ ∆RLONGINTRjt + h’ TR   (5) 
where it is expected that: 
 b’ > 0, c’ > 0, d’ < 0, e’ > o, f’ < 0, g’ < 0     (6)  
 Estimates of equation (5) and variations upon equation (5) that parallel the estimations 
shown in Table 2 are provided in Table 4. For the most part, these new results are qualitatively 
very similar to their counterparts in Table 2; indeed, except for the cases of the unemployment 
rate and the lagged dependent variable (∆ RPCYt-1, found only in column (c) of Table 4), the 
results shown in Table 4 provide results that are qualitatively entirely compatible with those in 
Table 2. Hence, from the perspective of the objectives of this study, we obtain additional results 
that, among other things, provide further support for the three central hypotheses being 
investigated in this study. In particular, from these results, we infer that the increase in the per 
capita real GDP growth rate is an increasing function of the percentage increase in economic 
freedom and regulatory quality while being a decreasing function of the percentage increase in 
the ratio of the tax burden to the GDP level.  
 
7.- Summary 
The fixed-effects estimations in this study all provide strong support for the three central 
hypotheses considered here, namely: (1) per capita real GDP growth depends directly upon the 
overall economic freedom index (FREEDOM), which in this study consists of seven of the ten 
Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom indices, presumably at least in part due to the 
ability of increased economic freedom to elevate the growth/rate of economic activity through 
incentives to work, invest, save, hire/dismiss, make market-based business decisions, and take 
risk and engage in risk-reward economic behaviors in a market-based economy; (2) per capita 
real GDP growth depends directly on the index of regulatory quality, REGQUAL, (World Bank 
Institute, 2012) because high quality regulation interferes less with the efficient functioning of 
firms’ decision-making processes in a market-based economy and contributes less to firms’ 
production costs, and (3) per capita real GDP growth is a decreasing function of the tax burden, 
expressed as a percent of GDP, TAXREVGDP, (OECD, 2013) because higher tax burdens reduce 
the growth rate of disposable income and thereby limit the growth rate of the ability to purchase 
new goods and services and hence reduce/restrict the rate of growth of economic activity.  
Naturally, these conclusions are at least somewhat preliminary. More work, alternative 
specifications involving additional or different variables (including different control variables) 
could yield broader, if not more compelling, insights. In addition, perhaps the adoption/study of 
alternative datasets, such as that by Gwartney, Lawson and Hall (2012), and/or additional years 
needs to be considered and estimated.11 Thus, although these results appear to suggest a strong 
relationship between the percentage rate of growth of per capita real GDP on the one hand and 
economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the overall tax burden on the other hand, this topic 
requires further scrutiny and formal investigation.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable    Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RPCY     26,969  11,636 
 
FREEDOM    69.98  7.788 
 
REGQUAL    1.302  0.437 
 
TAXREVGDP    35.92  7.198 
 
POLSTAB    0.77  0.53 
 
UR     6.66  3.27 
     
RLONGINTR    3.54  2.23  
 
G8DUMMY    0.241  0.43   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Initial Fixed-Effects Estimates  
Dependent Variable:  Log RPCY    
        
    (a)                    (b)  (c)                         
Log FREEDOM 1.02*** 1.093*** 1.355***   
   (2.78)  (3.07)  (2.59) 
   
Log REGQUAL 1.035*** 1.03*** 1.01*** 
   (7.37)  (7.29)  (6.39) 
   
Log TAXREVGDP -0.404*** -0.36** -0.384**  
   (-2.58)  (-2.30)  (-2.47) 
   
Log POLSTAB 0.176*  0.185** 0.19**   
   (1.68)  (1.98)  (2.00) 
   
Log UR  -0.167** -0.17** -0.172**  
   (-2.32)  (-2.41)  (-2.44)  
  
Log RLONGINTR -0.38*** -0.33*** -0.347***  
   (-3.37)  (-2.83)  (-3.12) 
   
G8DUMMY  -------  0.159*** 0.155*** 
     (3.47)  (3.52) 
 
Log RPCYt-1  -------  -------  -0.078 
(Lagged Dependent      (-0.95) 
Variable)      
 
TR   -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**     
             (-2.45)  (-2.27)  (-2.36) 
   
Constant  3.18*  2.55  2.43   
   (1.66)  (1.36)  (1.31)  
  
R2   0.78  0.79  0.79   
adjR2   0.76  0.77  0.77   
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically 
significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix among Explanatory Variables in Basic Model 
 
FREEDOM   REGQUAL    TAXREVGDP  POLSTAB  UR RLONGINTR 
 
FREEDOM  1.000 
 
REGQUAL  -0.181  1.000 
 
TAXREVGDP  -0.168  0.453  1.000 
 
POLSTAB  -0.498  -0.054  0.179  1.000 
 
UR   -0.488  0.072  0.088  0.205  1.000  
 
RLONGINTR 0.198  -0.439  -0.325  -0.115  -0.233  1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Additional Fixed-Effects Estimates  
Dependent Variable:  ∆ RPCY    
     
    (a)                    (b)  (c) 
                         
∆ FREEDOM  704.1*** 727.2*** 928.2***   
   (3.92)  (4.23)  (5.71) 
   
∆ REGQUAL  545.01*** 544.1*** 435.2*** 
   (13.65) (14.22) (10.10) 
   
∆ TAXREVGDP -356.3** -395.6*** -324.3**  
   (-2.38)  (-2.75)  (-2.47) 
   
∆ POLSTAB  147.31*** 155.7*** 127.5***   
   (3.93)  (4.32)  (3.84) 
   
∆ UR   -188.09 -143.4  -364.4  
   (-0.55)  (-0.44)  (-1.23)  
  
∆ RLONGINTR -889.9** -994.1** -1,241.04***  
   (-2.08)  (-2.41)  (-3.29) 
   
G8DUMMY  -------  6,800.8*** 8,253*** 
     (2.81)  (3.73) 
 
∆ RPCYt-1  -------  -------  -0.369*** 
(Lagged Dep. Var.)     (-4.23) 
 
TR   -178.2  --154.6 -64.43      
              (-0.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.24)) 
   
Constant  906.6  -823.4  -1,607.1   
   (0.49)  (-0.44)  (-0.94)  
  
R2   0.76  0.78  0.83   
adjR2   0.74  0.76  0.80   
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically 
significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
